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ABSTRACT 
 
Evacuation and Shelter in Place Modeling for a Release of Uranium Hexafluoride 
 
by 
 
Joseph Blake Harris  
 
Evacuation and sheltering behaviors were modeled for a hypothetical release of uranium 
hexafluoride (UF6) from Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) in Erwin, Tennessee.  NFS down-blends 
weapons grade Cold War-era nuclear fuel material and processes highly-enriched uranium 
occasionally using UF6 onsite.  Risk associated with a chemical release to the surrounding 
residential population was assessed by running 2 scenarios involving an airborne release of UF6 
to compare evacuation and sheltering in place actions as effective survival strategies.  Risk is 
minimal and evacuation is recommended for people within a 2-mile radius of the release point.  
Shelter in place actions are recommended for all critical facilities that have the potential to be 
affected by a chemical release plume.  Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Radiological 
Assessment System for Consequence Analysis and Capacity-Aware Shortest Path Evacuation 
Routing in conjunction with a geographic information system proved to be valuable 
technological tools in determining evacuation routing and exposure zones. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
     Hazards are defined as any event, situation, or thing that poses a threat to human life and/or 
health and can cause damage to property and/or the environment (Harriss et al. 1978).  In 
contrast, disasters are defined as crisis situations where the damage exceeds a community’s 
ability to recover through routine resources (Quarantelli 1990).  Industrial sites can present 
multiple hazards that endanger the health and safety of the adjacent population and multiple 
disasters at varying scales have been spawned from industrial hazards (e.g., Chernobyl, Three-
Mile Island, Love Canal, Bhopal, Fukushima).  Industrial hazards are perceived differently than 
other hazards because of the uncertainty associated with the hazard (Mitchell et al. 2007). 
Understanding the health effects and possible loss of life in such a disaster is necessary to help 
emergency managers determine how the effects can be mitigated by evacuation and sheltering in 
place strategies.  An emergency evacuation is the removal of the populace from the threat or 
actual occurrence of a disaster’s exposure zone (Georgiadou et al. 2007).  In the context of 
industrial hazards representing a risk to surrounding residential areas, a shelter in place strategy 
involves the residential populace remaining indoors, securing all openings to the dwelling, 
turning off all ventilation, and taking shelter in the innermost room of the dwelling (Chan et al. 
2007).  Decisions concerning evacuation and shelter in place strategies require advanced 
planning and preparations on many levels.  This type of predisaster planning is a key component 
of emergency preparedness, which is one of the 4 major phases of the emergency response 
management cycle (Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1:  Emergency Management Cycle. Adapted from the Federal Emergency Management 
                    Agency’s Emergency Management Cycle. 
 
 
Background Information 
 
Past Industrial Accidents 
     The full effect of an industrial accident is usually not known until an accident occurs because 
industrial hazards are dynamic and present a multitude of uncertainties.  The result is nonexistent 
or poorly planned emergency preparedness procedures, of which there are many examples 
including those in Flixborough, England; Seveso, Italy; and Bhopal, India (Garrik 1988).  The 
Flixborough disaster occurred on June 1, 1974, when a bypass pipe ruptured releasing a vapor 
cloud of cyclohexane that interacted with an ignition source causing a massive explosion (Venart 
2004).  The disaster resulted in 28 deaths and widespread property damage to approximately 
1,800 buildings (Venart 2004).  In the Seveso disaster of 1976, rising temperatures inside a 
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mixing reactor crossed a threshold that triggered the opening of a reactor valve, which resulted in 
the release of 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzodioxin (TCDD) that exposed over 37,000 people to the 
chemical (Bertazzi et al. 1998).  The deadliest industrial accident in history occurred in Bhopal 
in December 1984.  Over 100,000 people were exposed to hazardous materials after a gas leak 
occurred at a pesticide manufacturing plant (Bowonder 1985).  This resulted in the death of 
approximately 3,800 people with thousands more suffering acute and chronic health effects from 
the incident (Dhara and Dhara 2002; MacKenzie 2002). Collectively, these incidents caused 
government agencies and emergency managers to shift their attention to industrial sites where 
emergency preparedness procedures became a priority.  
 
History of Emergency Management in the United States 
     Emergency management in the United States dates back to the early 19th century when the 
federal government passed the Congressional Act of 1803, which provided financial assistance to 
a New Hampshire town devastated by fire.  However, the focus on emergency preparedness was 
not fully conceptualized until the Cold War began in the mid-20th century.  The Office of 
Defense Mobilization was created during this time for the purpose of mobilizing and stockpiling 
critical materials that would be needed during an attack.  Emergency preparedness was limited to 
Civil Defense purposes until the 1960s when the Office of Emergency Preparedness was formed 
to manage natural disasters.  By the 1970s, over 100 federal agencies where involved in some 
aspect of emergency management including emergency preparedness and this led to the creation 
of one centralized organization known as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  
The primary goal of FEMA was to prepare for and respond to anthropogenic and natural 
disasters.  FEMA encountered several incidents that demonstrated the complexities involved in 
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emergency management during the organization’s infancy such as the Love Canal toxic waste 
disaster in Niagara Falls, New York and the partial core meltdown on Three Mile Island in 
Pennsylvania.   
     These disasters along with the threat posed from nuclear power plants in the 1970s spurred 
FEMA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to focus more on the emergency 
preparedness aspect of disasters, which led to the creation of evacuation plans for populations 
within a 10 mile (16.1 km) radius of nuclear power plants (Urbanik 2000).  This zone of 10 miles 
(16.1 km) is known as an Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and is defined as the area where 
plume inhalation is expected to exceed the Environmental Protection Agency’s Action Guides 
(Collins and Galpin 1978; Podolak and Sanders 1988).  Spellman and Stoudt (2011) noted that a 
complete evacuation of the EPZ is not always necessary because the released material moves in 
the direction of the prevailing wind and will become more diluted as it travels away from the 
point of release.  As a general rule, it is recommended that everyone be evacuated who is within 
a 2 mile (3.2 km) radius of the release point as well as anyone within a 5 mile (8 km) radius 
downwind and adjacent to the projected plume path (Spellman and Stoudt 2011).  Adjacency 
accounts for a potential shift in wind speed or fluctuation in wind direction – 2 of the multiple 
complex and dynamic parameters that define industrial hazards and increase uncertainty for 
emergency planning and preparedness.  The shelter in place strategy is encouraged for those 
remaining within the 5 mile radius as well as for those outside the 5 mile radius but within the 10 
mile EPZ.  Evacuation decisions for populations within the 5 to 10 mile radius are continuously 
evaluated as the incident progresses, allowing those who are in immediate danger to evacuate 
quickly with minimal traffic congestion (Spellman and Stoudt 2011).   
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Protective Measures 
     Protective measures are actions taken to reduce the population’s exposure to hazardous 
material that has been released into the environment (Hans and Sell 1974).  Two types of 
protective actions are involved in the emergency preparation phase for an anthropogenic hazard.  
These 2 actions are emergency evacuation and sheltering in place.  The selection of one action or 
the combination of both actions are dependent upon the type of disaster, socio-demographic 
attributes, and distance from the incident (Hans and Sell 1974).   
 
Shelter in Place 
      A shelter in place action is often an effective approach in protecting the public from adverse 
health effects during and immediately following a chemical release (Chan et al. 2007).  Ideally, a 
population that is ordered to shelter in place remains indoors, secures all openings to the 
dwelling, turns off all ventilation , and takes shelter in the innermost room of the dwelling (Chan 
et al. 2007).  In addition to these actions, it is recommended by the Department of Homeland 
Security to take shelter in the innermost room above ground due to the ability of some chemicals 
to penetrate into basements.  Sealing cracks in the doors and windows of the innermost room is 
also recommended by using duct tape and heavy sheeting.  Sheltering in place reduces the 
individual’s exposure to a hazardous chemical as well as the confusion and chaos often 
associated with a large-scale evacuation (Jetter and Whitfield 2005). 
 
Emergency Evacuation 
     The impetus for emergency evacuation is most often the occurrence or imminent threat of a 
hazard when there is sufficient time to evacuate to a safe or safer place and sheltering in place is 
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unlikely to provide sufficient assurance of protection.   Past evacuations demonstrated that 
without proper planning emergency evacuations will not occur in an efficient manner.  Common 
examples of poorly planned evacuations occur when people are ordered to evacuate when it is 
unnecessary or when people who should evacuate ignore evacuation orders (Flynn 1979).  On 
March 28, 1979, the governor of Pennsylvania advised that preschool children and pregnant 
women within a 5-mile radius of the Three Mile Island nuclear power generating station should 
evacuate the area while everyone else up to a 10-mile radius should pursue a shelter in place 
strategy.  Most ignored this and decided to evacuate resulting in citizens evacuating from a 
radius of 25 miles (Flynn 1979).  In 2005 citizens of New Orleans, Louisiana were ordered to 
evacuate the city during the arrival of Hurricane Katrina, but many remained due to their 
inability or unwillingness to evacuate (Elder et al. 2007). 
 
Anthropogenic Health Impacts and Incidents 
     Thousands of hazardous chemical releases occur annually within the United States 
(Zimmerman et al. 2008).  These releases can cause a number of acute and chronic health 
problems for affected populations.  Acute (short-term) health effects are caused by the initial 
exposure to a chemical hazard and require immediate medical attention, while chronic (long-
term) health effects are manifested slowly over time after the initial contact to hazardous 
chemicals.   
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Uranium Hexafluoride Health Effects 
     Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is a chemical compound that is used at fabrication facilities to 
create fuel for nuclear reactors.  UF6 reacts with water or water vapor forming hydrogen fluoride 
(HF) and uranyl fluoride (UO2F2). 
UF6 + 2H2O = UO2F2 + 4HF + Heat 
Heat that is released from the chemical reaction causes these chemicals to become buoyant and 
rise in a plume (McGuire 1991).  The health effects associated with exposure to UF6, HF, and 
UO2F2 chemicals are dependent upon the amount and length of time of exposure as well as the 
health and age of the individual exposed (McGuire 1991).  Of the 3 chemicals, HF can pose the 
highest threat to human beings  Exposure to HF can cause several acute effects including death 
related to cardiac or respiratory failure.  Inhalation of HF can cause pulmonary edema and severe 
irritation of the respiratory system.  Eye or skin exposure to HF can result in severe ocular 
irritation and dermal burns.  Chronic effects associated with HF exposure include damage to the 
liver, kidneys and lungs; irritation and congestion of the nose, throat, and bronchi; increased 
bone density; and anemia and hypersensitivity (Thiessen et al. 1988). 
     Emergency Response Planning Guides (ERPG) provide a guideline for the dose exposure 
needed to cause health effects for a 1-hour exposure time.  There are 3 tiers of the ERPG: ERPG-
1 is the maximum dose to which a human being can be exposed without experiencing any 
negative health effects; ERP-2 is the maximum hourly dose a human can be exposed to without 
experiencing irreversible serious health effects; and ERP-3 is the maximum hourly dose a human 
can be exposed to without life-threatening health effects.  The ERP-1 range for HF is 0.001 to 2 
ppm, ERP-2 is 2 to 20ppm, ERP-3 is 20 to 50ppm and anything above 50 ppm can cause life 
threatening health effects. 
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Uranium Hexafluoride Incidents 
     There have been several incidents involving UF6 chemicals including a release of UF6 at the 
Sequoyah Fuels Corporation Facility in Gore, Oklahoma.  This accident occurred in 1986 when 
an over-loaded 14 ton cylinder ruptured during a reheating process attempting to remove excess 
UF6.  One individual died from inhalation of HF with an additional 31 workers experiencing 
short-term kidney damage from HF exposure (Shum et al. 1986).  In 1978 a cylinder ruptured at 
the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant after it was accidentally dropped in the storage yard 
releasing over 6.5 tons of UF6 (DOE 2000).  UF6 incidents are rare occurrences and it is 
therefore unlikely that a major catastrophe will occur again soon, but these incidents highlight 
the potential for future UF6 incidents and the need to have contingency measures in place that 
mitigate exposure. 
 
Study Area 
 
Erwin, Tennessee 
     The town of Erwin, located in the Appalachian Mountains of Northeast Tennessee, is situated 
along the border of the Cherokee National Forest in Unicoi County approximately 15 miles south 
of Johnson City.  Unicoi County contains residential, industrial, commercial, and farming areas.  
Erwin has a population of 6,097 and Unicoi County has a population of 18, 313 (US Census 
2010).  Erwin would benefit from elevated levels of emergency preparedness based on its 
proximity to a potentially dangerous rail yard and an industrial site, Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) 
(Figure 1.2).  Approximately 35% of the citizens within Unicoi County live within 2 miles of 
NFS (Figure 1.3).  This places approximately 3,000 housing units within a 2-mile radius of NFS 
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with an average household size of 2.1 persons (Figures 1.4 and 1.5).  Population density is 
centered in the downtown area of Erwin (Figure 1.6).  Several densely populated critical 
facilities (e.g. schools, nursing homes, and hospitals) are also situated near the NFS facility 
(Figure 1.2).  Erwin Health Care Center and Love Chapel Elementary School (it is important to 
note that this school was closed on August 2012 due to sinkhole hazards) are located less than a 
mile from the site, while Unicoi County Middle School, Unicoi County High School, Unicoi 
County Memorial Hospital, and the Center on Aging and Health are situated within 2 miles of 
NFS (Figure 1.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2:  Critical Facilities in Erwin, Tennessee.  All critical facilities within 2 miles of   
                    Nuclear Fuel Services.   
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Figure 1.3: Total Population per Census Block 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4:  Total Housing Units per Census Block 
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Figure 1.5:  Average Household Size per Census Block 
 
 
Figure 1.6:  Population Density per Square Mile.  Population density of Erwin, Tennessee per   
                    census blocks. 
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Nuclear Fuel Services 
     NFS is a nuclear fuel manufacturing plant located on the south side of Erwin, Tennessee.  Its 
primary functions are the down-blending of Cold War-era nuclear fuel material into useable low-
enriched uranium (LEU) for the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) commercial reactors and 
processing highly-enriched uranium (HEU) into useable nuclear fuel for the United States 
Navy’s nuclear fleet.  NFS began fuel fabrication services in 1959 and has operated continuously 
since (US NRC 2014).  To date, NFS has never had an occurrence severe enough to require the 
evacuation of Erwin, but there have been numerous incidents since down-blending began at the 
NFS site.  On March 6, 2006, nine gallons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) leaked onto the 
plant floor (US NRC 2007).  A fire occurred on November 14, 2009, within the cylinder 
sublimation station (US NRC 2009).  A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Event Notification Report filed 
in January 2010 in response to the 2009 fire noted that there may be over-pressurized UF6 
containers located on site at NFS (US NRC 2010).  On January 9, 2012, NFS experienced a nitric 
acid leak that expelled approximately 300 gallons of the chemical (US NRC 2012).  All of these 
incidents were contained on site and did not endanger any citizens of the community, but the 
potential for future incidents should be considered when developing components of an 
emergency preparedness plan for Erwin residents and NFS.  UF6 may or may not still be on the 
premises, but based on previous incident reports the facility at some point in time had UF6 and a 
hypothetical scenario is being proposed based on UF6. 
 
Research Goals 
     Preparing for a possible disaster is an important aspect of emergency management and it is 
imperative to be proactive in understanding a potential threat to speed up response times and 
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mitigate potential injury and loss of life.  Completion of this study will 1) determine the risk 
associated with a chemical release to the population adjacent to NFS, 2) determine the 
effectiveness of mandatory evacuation and/or shelter in place strategies for the community, 3) 
demonstrate the usefulness of available software in the emergency preparedness phase as it 
relates to modeling evacuation and sheltering behaviors, and 4) identify critical facilities (e.g., 
schools, hospitals, nursing homes) that are at higher risk than the regular populace.   This thesis 
does not imply that a disaster will occur at NFS but examines the possibility of a hypothetical 
disaster and illustrates the utility of various models in analyzing the impact of exposure to a 
potential hazard and the adequacy of current infrastructure in facilitating a timely evacuation 
and/or shelter in place action.  Preparing for the possibility of a potential exposure to either UF6 
or any other airborne chemical may reduce the loss of human lives and establish actionable 
protocol for Erwin, Tennessee.  In contrast, establishing that UF6 does not represent a substantial 
risk might go a long way in assuring residents in Erwin that while UF6 may be a past, present, or 
future hazard onsite, it is unlikely to pose a threat to people offsite. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS FOR ERWIN, TENNESSEE IN RESPONSE TO 
A POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARD 
 
Joseph B. Harris, Dr. Chris Gregg, Dr. T. Andrew Joyner and Dr. Ingrid Luffman 
 
Department of Geosciences, College of Arts and Sciences, East Tennessee State University 
 
Johnson City, Tennessee 37614, United States 
____________________________________ 
 
 
Abstract - The protective measures of evacuation and shelter in place actions were 
analyzed by identifying the population at risk using historical meteorological data to 
create uranium hexafluoride (UF6) plume models.  Two hypothetical scenarios used 
plume models to determine if the infrastructure was sufficient to accommodate a 
mandatory evacuation and to identify the critical facilities and/or residential facilities that 
would be needed to shelter in place. Overall, evacuations from the affected area were 
efficient and accomplished in a timely manner, and all critical facilities that would benefit 
from sheltering in place were identified.  The study concluded that the risk of release of 
UF6 from a cylinder rupture is low and that the impact of an incident would be minor.  
Nevertheless, an emergency action protocol should be implemented to provide advanced 
preparation for the community. 
 
1. Introduction 
     Industrial facilities that processes hazardous materials have the potential to endanger the 
health and safety of the nearby population.  Communities therefore need to remain vigilant and 
develop emergency protocols that provide protection in the event of release.  This type of 
planning is a key component of emergency preparedness, which is one of the four major phases 
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of the emergency management cycle.  Community and individual response to releases of 
hazardous materials often involve evacuation and sheltering in place as a means to limit exposure 
to the hazard agent. 
1.1 Background Information 
     The town of Erwin, located in the Appalachian Mountains of Northeast Tennessee, is situated 
near the Cherokee National Forest and the Nolichucky River approximately 15 miles south of 
Johnson City, Tennessee and 45 miles north of Asheville, North Carolina.  Nuclear Fuel Service 
(NFS) is a uranium fuel fabrication plant that was built and has operated continuously within the 
city limits of Erwin since 1959.  NFS down-blends Cold War-era nuclear fuel material into 
useable low-enriched uranium (LEU) for the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) commercial 
reactors.  NFS also processes highly-enriched uranium (HEU) into useable nuclear fuel for the 
United States Navy’s nuclear fleet. One of the major chemical compounds used at fabrication 
facilities to create fuel for nuclear reactors is uranium hexafluoride (UF6).  When released into 
the atmosphere, UF6 will react with the water vapor present in the environment forming 
hydrogen fluoride (HF) and uranyl fluoride (UO2F2) [1].  Human exposure to HF gas can cause 
chronic and acute health effects ranging from skin burns to lung damage [2].  The health effects 
associated with HF gas are dependent upon the amount and length of exposure to the chemical 
[2,3].  Emergency Response Planning Guides (ERPG) estimate that a dose greater than 50 ppm 
over a one hour period have the potential to induce life threatening health effects. Limiting a 
population’s exposure time to the chemical is key to mitigating injuries and loss of life [4].  This 
can be accomplished through protective measures such as an evacuation or sheltering in place 
[4]. 
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     Evacuation is defined as the removal of the populace from the threat, or actual occurrence of, 
a hazardous exposure zone [5].  Sheltering in place action is defined as finding shelter indoors, 
securing all openings to the dwelling, turning off all ventilation, and taking shelter in the 
innermost room of the dwelling [6].  These actions can be used independently or in combination 
with each other to mitigate injuries and loss of life to the populace in the affected area.  An 
emergency plan can be constructed that implements these protective measures using current 
modeling software available to researchers and emergency management. 
1.2 Modeling and Software Applications in Emergency Preparedness           
     A geographic information system (GIS) integrates both hardware and software to aid in 
analyzing, capturing, managing and displaying geographic data [7].  In the context of emergency 
preparedness, a GIS is a valuable tool because it has the capability to analyze a network dataset 
to determine if road networks are capable of handling evacuation traffic loads, identifying 
effective evacuation routes, and identifying safe zones away from hazard zones [8].  A GIS is not 
limited to just network analysis.  It has the ability to model complex scenarios when the hazard 
itself is viewed in relation to spatial data [8].  
     Capacity-Aware Shortest Path Evacuation Routing (ArcCASPER) is a network analyst tool 
used in conjunction with a GIS (specifically ArcMap 10.0) to produce evacuation routes to the 
nearest safe area incorporating typical road capacity and travel times to reduce evacuation times 
and congestion [9].  ArcCASPER uses three separate algorithms to allow the user the ability to 
compare the results and identify the most effective method.  These algorithms are shortest path, 
Capacity Constrained Route Planning (CCRP), and Capacity-Aware Shortest Path Evacuation 
Routing (CASPER).  The shortest path method is the fastest of the three methods, but ignores 
road capacity and has very low accuracy [9].  The CCRP algorithm prioritizes evacuees based on 
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their distance from the safe zone, by giving those with longer travel times the ability to divert to 
alternate routes until that roadway is at capacity [9].  The CASPER algorithm takes evacuees 
with the longest travel times and assigns them to a shortest path.  Edge costs (amount of time it 
takes to travel a segment of road) are constantly updated to ensure global evacuation times are at 
a minimum [9].   
     Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis (RASCAL) version 4.3 is an 
emergency response consequence assessment tool developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission makes dose and consequence projections in 
the event of a radiological emergency and these serve to inform the RASCAL model [10].  
RASCAL evaluates meteorological and atmospheric conditions around nuclear facilities to 
provide an assessment of the incident (e.g., plume models, plume height, plume temperatures) 
[10].  ArcCASPER and RASCAL alone are valuable tools to a user, but combined they become a 
viable option in preparing actionable protocols for communities that may be at risk to a hazard 
and who desire to mitigate exposure by evacuation and sheltering. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
     The objectives of this study are to 1) demonstrate the utility of evacuation modeling for 
industrial hazards producing offsite airborne hazards, 2) determine if mandatory evacuations are 
preferable over sheltering in place, and 3) determine if the current infrastructure (roads) is 
sufficient to accommodate a mandatory evacuation.  Depending on the intensity (rate of release), 
volume, and dose of UF6 released, it may be better for citizens within the area to opt for a shelter 
in place action over a mandatory evacuation action, but no information is currently available to 
assist in making this crucial decision.  Examination of the infrastructure will assist in 
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determining the time it takes to evacuate an area, possible congestion points that may halt 
evacuation, and identification of timely evacuation routes. 
2. Experimental 
2.1 Data and Methods 
     When evaluating emergency preparedness solutions involving a UF6 release, it is important to 
take into account the current meteorological conditions since this will determine if evacuation 
and/ or a shelter in place strategy is necessary for the community surrounding the industrial site.  
For example, a strong northerly wind indicates that a UF6 plume will be carried in a southern 
direction affecting those who are located south of the site while conversely a southerly wind will 
carry a UF6 in a northern direction affecting the community north of the site. RASCAL version 
4.3 was used because the software allows for the input of meteorological data from the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather station located at the Tri City 
Regional Airport (KTRI) in Blountville, Tennessee – the closest reliable weather station in the 
area.  The variables used in this process were wind speed, wind direction, estimated atmospheric 
stability, precipitation type, ambient air temperature, air pressure, and relative humidity.  For the 
purpose of this study, the averages of historical meteorological data for the four calendar seasons 
(spring, summer, autumn, and winter) along with the yearly averages for the year 2012 were 
calculated to determine if potential differences in dispersion occur seasonally.  A 30 year period 
of averages for wind speed and direction were calculated and compared with the averages for the 
year 2012 to determine if the 2012 averages were above or below the normal averages for the 
area.  Spring was defined as March, April and May; Summer as June, July, and August; Autumn 
as September, October, and November; and Winter as December, January, and February.  These 
data were then combined with the cylinder inventory volume (Table 2.1) and release rate for 
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liquid UF6 based on a cylinder rupture with a release fraction of 0.65, a release rate of 32 kg/s, 
and a cylinder enrichment level of 5% [10] to calculate the transportation, dispersion, and 
deposition of material for a one hour period from the initial release start time.  This process 
created twelve plume models for each season and one plume model for yearly averages for 
hydrogen fluoride (HF) concentration, HF deposition, uranium (U) concentration, and U 
deposition which were imported into ArcMap 10.0 to determine the area that would be affected. 
 
Table 2.1: UF6 Cylinder Type and Volume [10] 
Cylinder Type Volume of UF6 (kg) 
Model 30A and 30B (2.5 ton) 2,277 
Model 48A and 48X (10 ton) 9,539 
Model 48Y, 48G, 48F and 48H (14 ton) 12,338 
 
 
     ArcMap 10.0 is the feature program within a geographic information system (GIS) created by 
the Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) and is used for map creation, spatial and 
statistical analysis, data editing and creation, and GIS dataset management.  A GIS was used to 
import plume data and identify areas that are affected by a UF6 chemical release.  A dataset of 
Unicoi County, Tennessee at the census block level that included total population and housing 
units was used to determine the average household size per census block.  The location of NFS 
and all critical facilities within a two mile radius (EPZ) of NFS were mapped within the GIS.  A 
buffer zone of two miles was created to aid in determining areas that require mandatory 
evacuation and facilities that would benefit from a shelter in place action [11]. 
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     For evacuation modeling, ArcCASPER (Table 2.2) requires a network dataset (e.g., 
interconnected roadways with intersections nodes) to be built and subsequent analyses were 
performed on that dataset.  Two road networks of Unicoi County were digitized using an ESRI 
road basemap of Unicoi County and two network datasets were created based on the area roads.  
One dataset included the entire road network for Unicoi County while the other dataset excluded 
a segment of Tennessee Highway 107.  A capacity field was added to the dataset to account for 
the number of lanes contained in each road segment.  Locations of the populace to be evacuated 
within two miles of NFS and the population downwind and adjacent to the plume were created 
using population totals at the census block level.  Locations of the safe zones were determined by 
the plume direction.  Some safe zone locations were located within the EPZ, as the main 
purposes of evacuation are to route evacuees to the nearest road that would allow for the quick 
departure from the chemical plume or to the nearest access point to United State Interstate 26 
where emergency management personnel would have the ability to direct traffic out of harm’s 
way more quickly than on state roads.  This is achievable because of an increase in both road 
capacity and speed limit.  The ArcCASPER process was compiled using the yearly average 
plume model to identify the areas at risk involving two hypothetical scenarios devised to 
determine the effectiveness of a mass evacuation. 
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Table 2.2:  Comparison of Evacuation Model Methods 
 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
 
 
 
ArcCASPER 
 Three different model algorithms 
available (Shortest Path, CASPER, 
and Capacity Constrained Route 
Planner). 
 Easy to validate and reproduce 
models. 
 Output allows for the visualization 
of edge statistics and route costs. 
 Only compatible with the 
network analyst tool within 
ArcMap. 
 Requires a network with no 
accuracy, alignment, or 
topological errors to 
function properly.  
 
Agent Based 
Modeling 
 
 
 Models are close to reality. 
 Ability to control agent behavior to 
simulate “real life” situations. 
  
 Difficult to validate and 
reproduce the model. 
 Amount of data needed to 
influence agent behavior can 
be overwhelming. 
 Models can be difficult to 
disseminate. 
 
 
Least Cost 
 Distance 
Modeling 
 Evacuation routing is not 
constrained to a road network 
allowing for different transportation 
options. 
 Slope and land cover data can be 
used to calculate travel costs. 
 Compatible with a GIS. 
 Travel cost is calculated for 
each raster cell which 
requires high resolution data 
to ensure accurate travel 
times. 
 Limited to shortest path 
approach. 
 
 
 
2.2 Scenarios 
     Two hypothetical evacuation model scenarios were created for this study.  Scenario number 
one uses the entire road network for the evacuation model.  Scenario number two simulates a 
train restricting the movement of cars on a segment of Tennessee 107 which is a main arterial 
road providing ingress and egress to and from Erwin.  Erwin is unique in that the rail system runs 
parallel to US HWY 26 and in between the highway and the town.  This creates limited 
evacuation points if a train happens to stop on the tracks in the downtown area.  Two different 
algorithms (shortest path and CASPER) were used for each scenario to determine the 
effectiveness of the CASPER algorithm in evacuation modeling.  Safe zone locations for each 
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model were determined to be Tennessee Highway 81 (Jonesborough Road) to the northwest, 
Tennessee Highway 352 (Temple Hill Road) to the south, Tennessee Highway 107 (North Main 
Avenue) to the north, US Highway 26 access on 2nd Street, and US Highway 26 access on 
Jackson Love Highway (Figure 2.1).  A total of 250 evacuee locations were created using 
population totals at the census block level creating an evacuation size of 6,069 people. 
 
 
Figure 2.1:  Major Arterial Roads and Safe Zones  
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3.  Results 
3.1 Meteorological and Plume Results 
     Average wind direction for the year 2012 were comparable to the average wind directions for 
the historical 30 year period while average wind speeds were found to be significantly higher for 
the year 2012 (T-test results of 7.84; p < 0.01) (Table 2.3).  Average wind speed for the seasons 
in the year 2012 ranged from 6.2 mph (9.9 km/h) to 8.4 mph (13.5 km/h) with wind direction 
ranging from 262° to 276° (Table 2.4 and Appendix A).  Average air temperature ranged from 
41.7°F (5.4°C) to 72.7°F (22.6°C) with the winter season representing the coldest season and 
summer representing the warmest season (Table 2.4).  Barometric pressure for the seasons was 
fairly consistent for three of the four seasons.  The average barometric pressure was 1018mb and 
the summer season averaged 1015mb (Table 2.4).  The spring season has the lowest relative 
humidity with an average of 70.6% (Table 2.4).  Relative humidity in the other seasons ranged 
from 75.8% to 76.9% with winter having the highest percentage (Table 2.4).  Results for each 
season are described in the paragraphs below. 
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Table 2.3:  Average Wind Speed and Direction for 30 Years and 2012 
30 Year Wind Averages 2012 Wind Averages 
Season Wind Speed Wind 
Direction 
Season Wind Speed Wind 
Direction 
Spring 6.5 mph 
 
(10.5 km/h) 
268° Spring 7.5 mph    
(12.1 km/h) 
268° 
Summer 4.3 mph 
(6.9 km/h) 
270° Summer 6.2 mph 
 
(9.9 km/h) 
271° 
Autumn 4.8 mph 
(7.7 km/h) 
275° Autumn 6.6 mph 
(10.6 km/h) 
276° 
Winter 6.7 mph 
(10.8 km/h) 
275° Winter 8.4 mph    
 (13.5 km/h) 
262° 
Annual 5.5 mph 
(8.9 km/h) 
267° Annual 7.2 mph 
(11.6 km/h) 
267° 
 
Table 2.4:  Meteorological Averages by Season for the Year 2012 
Season Wind 
Speed 
Wind 
Direction 
Air Temp Pressure Relative 
Humidity 
Precipitation 
Spring 7.5 mph   
(12.1 km/h) 
268° 60.5°F 
(15.8°C) 
1016 mb 70.6% Rain 
Summer 6.2 mph 
 
(9.9 km/h) 
271° 72.7°F 
(22.6°C) 
1015 mb 75.8% Light Rain 
Autumn 6.6 mph    
(10.6 km/h) 
276° 54.5°F 
(12.5°C) 
1018 mb 76.7% Rain 
Winter 8.4 mph    
(13.5 km/h) 
262° 41.7°F 
(5.4°C) 
1018 mb 76.9% Light Snow 
Yearly 7.2 mph 
(11.6 km/h) 
267° 57.4°F 
(6.7°C) 
1017 mb 74.9% Rain 
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     The spring UF6 plume reached a peak maximum temperature of 168°F (76°C) at a distance of 
31 meters from the release point (Figure 2.2).  The plume temperature then decreased after the 
plume extended beyond 31 meters with the temperature falling to 136°F (58°C) at 65 meters 
from the release point (Figure 2.2).  The plume height ascended rapidly between 30 and 65 
meters from the release point from a height of 5 meters to a height of 52 meters at a distance of 
65 meters (Figure 2.3).  According to the model, all UF6 reacted with moisture at a distance of 
64.4 meters from the release point. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2:  UF6 Plume Temperatures for All Seasons 
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Figure 2.3:  UF6 Plume Heights for All Seasons 
 
     The summer UF6 plume reached a peak maximum temperature of 165°F (74°C) at a distance 
of 27 meters from the release point (Figure 2.2).  The plume temperature then decreased after the 
plume traveled beyond 54 meters with the temperature falling to 150°F (66°C) at 83 meters from 
the release point (Figure 2.2).  The plume height ascended rapidly between 28 and 83 meters 
from the release point from a height of 5 meters to a height of 75 meters at a distance of 83 
meters from the release point (Figure 2.3).  According to the model, all UF6 reacted with 
moisture at a distance of 82.9 meters from the release point.    
     The autumn UF6 plume reached a peak maximum temperature of 167°F (75°C) at a distance 
of 28 meters from the release point (Figure 2.2).  The plume temperature remained consistently 
high until the plume reached a distance of 60 meters when the temperature dropped from 159°F 
(71°C) to 77°F (25°C) at a distance of 88 meters (Figure 2.2).  The plume height ascended 
rapidly from a height of 5 meters to 59 meters at a distance of 60 meters from the release point 
and then increased gradually to a height of 70 meters at a distance of 88 meters from the release 
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point (Figure 2.3).  Per the model, all UF6 reacted with moisture at a distance of 88.1 meters 
from the release point. 
       The winter UF6 plume reached a peak maximum temperature of 156°F (69°C) at a distance 
of 32 meters from the release point (Figure 2.2).  The plume temperature was consistent from the 
release point to 32 meters when the temperature dropped drastically to 77°F (25°C) at a distance 
of 65 meters from the release point and then decreased gradually to a temperature of 69°F (21°C) 
at a distance of 130 meters from the release point (Figure 2.2).  The plume height ascended 
drastically from a height of 5 meters at a distance of 32 meters from the release point to a height 
of 62 meters at a distance of 130 meters from the release point (Figure 2.3).  Per the model, all 
UF6 reacted with moisture at a distance of 128.7 meters from the release point.  
     HF concentration plume models for all seasons and tank sizes ranged from 0.001 ppm to 50 
ppm with health effects ranging from no adverse health effects to life threatening health effects 
(Figure 2.4 and Appendix B).  HF deposition plume models for all seasons and tanks sizes 
ranged from 0.001 g/m2 to 1 g/m2 (Figure 2.4 and Appendix B).  U concentration plume models 
for all seasons and tank sizes fell below the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
Protection Action Guides (PAG) range in the 0.001 to 1 rem range (Figure 2.4 and Appendix B).  
U deposition plume models for all seasons and tank sizes ranged from 0.01 g/m2 to 100 g/m2 
(Figure 2.4 and Appendix B). 
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Figure 2.4:  HF and Uranium Concentration and Deposition Plume Models.  Models are based on   
                    a 14 ton cylinder using meteorological averages for the year 2012.  
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     Based on past UF6 incidents it is determined that the possibility of a cylinder rupture 
occurring is low and if a cylinder rupture did occur the impact to the adjacent community would 
be minor (Table 2.5).  Table 2.5 identifies expected impacts for ruptures of cylinders of varying 
size.  
 
Table 2.5:  Risk Assessment Matrix for Erwin, Tennessee 
 
 
Cylinder Rupture Risk Assessment 
 
 
Impact 
 
2.5 Ton Cylinder 
 
 
10 Ton Cylinder 
 
14 Ton Cylinder 
 
Multiple Tank 
Ruptures 
 
 
Catastrophic 
 
 
Very Low 
 
Very Low 
 
Very Low 
 
Very Low 
 
Major 
 
 
Very Low 
 
Very Low 
 
Very Low 
 
Very Low 
 
Moderate 
 
 
Very Low 
 
Very Low 
 
Very Low 
 
Very Low 
 
Minor 
 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Very Low 
 
Insignificant 
 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Very Low 
     
3.2 Scenario 1 Results 
     Scenario number one allowed for the use of the entire road network (i.e., state maintained 
roads) for evacuation purposes.  The shortest path algorithm resulted in the evacuation of the 
EPZ in 66 minutes (Table 2.6).  The majority of the evacuation routes were in the high range of 
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55 to 66 minutes (i.e., it “cost” an evacuee 55-66 minutes of time to evacuate to the nearest safe 
zone) with less than a quarter of all evacuation routes in the < 11 minute range (Table 2.6).  The 
55 to 66 minute evacuation routes centered in the downtown area of Erwin (Figure 2.5).  The 
major road arteries affected by congestion were Ohio Avenue, Carolina Avenue, North Main 
Avenue and Love Street (Figure 2.1 and 2.5). 
 
Table 2.6:  Scenario 1 Shortest Path Algorithm Evacuation Time Distribution 
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Figure 2.5:  Scenario 1 Evacuation Model Using the Shortest Path Algorithm 
 
 
     The CASPER algorithm resulted in the evacuation of the EPZ in 33 minutes (Table 2.7).  The 
majority of the evacuation routes ranged between 20 to 25 minutes which accounted for 
approximately 20% of the total evacuation population (Table 2.7).  Congestion points ranged in 
the 25 to 33 minute range (Table 2.7).  The major arterial roads affected by congestion were 
located in the southern portion of the EPZ (Figure 2.6) and included Chestoa Pike, Jackson Love 
Highway, and Carolina Avenue (Figure 2.1 and 2.6). 
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Table 2.7: Scenario 1 CASPER Algorithm Evacuation Time Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Scenario 1 Evacuation Model Using the CASPER Algorithm 
42 
 
3.3 Scenario 2 Results 
     Scenario number two simulated a train restricting the movement of cars on a segment of 
Tennessee 107, so a portion of the road was unavailable within the evacuation model.  The 
shortest path algorithm for scenario two resulted in the evacuation of the EPZ in 72 minutes 
(Table 2.8).  The majority of the evacuation routes were 24 to 36 minute range followed by the 
60 to 72 minute range (Table 2.8).  Congestion was centered in the southeast section of Erwin 
affecting the major roadways of Ohio Avenue and Jackson Love Highway (Figure 2.1 and 2.7). 
 
Table 2.8: Scenario 2 Shortest Path Algorithm Evacuation Time Distribution  
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Figure 2.7:  Scenario 2 Evacuation Model Using the Shortest Path Algorithm.  The red crosses in     
                    top center of figure indicate road closer due to trains blocking the roadway.  An  
                    overpass bridge is located approximately 2 miles north and an underpass bridge is  
                    located approximately 3 miles south of this point. 
 
 
     The CASPER algorithm for scenario number 2 resulted in the evacuation of the entire EPZ in 
42 minutes (Table 2.9).  The majority of the evacuation routes ranged between 21 to 28 minutes 
(Table 2.9).  Congestion points for the CASPER algorithm for scenario 2 were located in the 
downtown area and in south Erwin (Figure 2.8).  The congested roads in the downtown area 
were secondary roads.  Primary roads in the southern section that were affected by congestion 
were Carolina Avenue, portions of Jackson Love Highway, and portions of Ohio Avenue (Figure 
2.1 and 2.8). 
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Table 2.9: Scenario 2 CASPER Algorithm Evacuation Time Distribution 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Scenario 2 Evacuation Model Using the CASPER Algorithm 
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4. Discussion and Conclusions 
     Wind speed has a direct influence on a chemical plume’s dispersion across an area.  Wind 
speed for the year 2012 was higher than the 30 year average which resulted in the chemical 
plume traveling further from the chemical release point due to an increase in velocity, but also 
reduced the width of the plume per the model.  In contrast, lower wind speeds decreased the 
dispersal distance of the plume from the release point, but increased the width of the plume. 
     U deposition is dependent upon meteorological conditions and mas released, with stronger 
winds and larger tank sizes (filled to capacity) creating a higher level of U deposition across a 
larger area.  Despite this, the models demonstrate that the levels of U concentration remain 
below the EPA PAG range and are not an immediate health hazard.  Similar results were found 
for HF deposition, but HF concentration could be significant enough to cause life threatening 
health effects as mass increases.  A 2.5 ton cylinder filled to capacity in any season has the 
potential to cause severe health effects, but an increase to a 10 ton cylinder filled to capacity 
introduces the possibility of life threatening health effects.  The 14 ton cylinder life threatening 
zone stays consistent with the 10 ton cylinder results, but the severe health effects zone extends 
farther from the release site. The yearly averages along with the 14 ton cylinder specifications 
allowed for the evaluation of evacuation and shelter in place actions that can be implemented in 
the early stages of a UF6 release for any season. 
     Sheltering in place is suggested in both scenarios for all critical facilities in the direct path of 
the UF6 plume.  Evacuation of large populations from critical facilities such as schools, hospitals 
and nursing homes takes considerable time, which increases an individual’s exposure to a 
hazardous cloud.  This increase in exposure time also increases the odds of an individual to 
experience life-threatening health effects.  This strategy is also recommended for citizens who 
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lack the means to evacuate due to a lack of transportation, poor health or age, and for those 
outside of the two mile buffer zone.      
      The CASPER evacuation algorithm was determined to be the most effective method of 
modeling evacuation routes.  In both scenarios, CASPER outperformed the shortest path 
algorithm in the total time it takes to evacuate the EPZ.  It was determined in scenario number 
two that a train blocking Tennessee Highway 107 would increase the total time it takes to 
evacuate the EPZ in the CASPER model by 9 minutes and by 6 minutes in the shortest path.  In 
both scenarios, the major road ways of Carolina Avenue, Jackson Love Highway, and Ohio 
Avenue experienced the most congestion.  These areas are very close to the release point, but the 
evacuation times are short enough to reduce the exposure to UF6 so an evacuation is still 
suggested for those residents over a shelter in place action if the evacuation order is given 
directly after the release occurs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DISCUSSION AND MAJOR FINDINGS 
     The following are all major findings of this study: 
1)  UF6 plume models were created based on yearly meteorological conditions for the 
year 2012 and imported into a GIS. Areas affected by a UF6 plume were identified 
and protective measures were recommended. 
2) All critical facilities were identified and a shelter in place action was recommended 
for these facilities due to transportation needs and exposure time. 
3) RASCAL 4.3 and ArcCASPER in conjunction with a GIS have demonstrated the 
usefulness of software in developing an emergency action plan.  RASCAL 4.3 
allowed for the creation of plume models to identify at risk areas once the plume 
models were imported into a GIS.  The ArcCASPER network analyst tool not only 
created adequate evacuation routes but provided the option of choosing between 3 
separate algorithms that allow the user to compare the results of the 3 methods. 
4) Evacuation actions were recommended for the populace within 2 miles of the 
chemical release point and for those in the direct plume path outside of the 2-mile 
zone extending up to 5 miles.  Shelter in place actions were recommended for all 
critical facilities within 2 miles of the chemical release point and for the facilities in 
the direct plume path outside of the 2-mile zone. 
     Past evacuations have demonstrated that emergency evacuations do not always occur as 
planned due to the population’s perception of the risk or their inability to evacuate.  In the Three 
Mile Island incident, the governor ordered only pregnant women and preschool children within a 
5-mile radius to evacuate, but the majority of the populace ignored this order resulting in the 
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evacuation of a 25 mile radius.  In contrast, an evacuation order was issued to the citizens of 
New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, but a substantial amount of the populace refused to 
evacuate or did not have the ability to evacuate.  These incidents highlight the need to increase 
predisaster education efforts that are focused on increasing people’s timely compliance with 
evacuation and sheltering orders. 
 
Study Limitations 
     There were limitations within this study pertaining to available data.  The availability of a 
reliable road network for GIS analysis was one of the early challenges.  Many of the digitized 
roads within the available road networks did not match the base maps available in ESRI’s 
ArcMap 10.0.  One of these datasets was the US Census Bureau’s Topologically Integrated 
Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) road dataset.  This dataset contained several 
discrepancies that made the data ineffective in creating a network dataset.  These discrepancies 
involved the absence of some roads within Unicoi County, the addition of roads that do not 
physically exist, and a misrepresentation of some road segments (e.g. wrong location, wrong 
length, missing segments).  To counter these problems, the road network of Unicoi County was 
digitized from satellite imagery to ensure accuracy of the road network and improve the 
reliability of model results. 
     Another problem encountered during this study was the lack of a weather station with 
accurate and reliable data in Erwin, Tennessee.  The nearest reliable weather station was situated 
approximately 50 miles away in Blountville, Tennessee.  Erwin is located within a valley that 
may experience mountain-valley breezes that impact wind speed, wind direction and 
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temperatures.  A reliable weather station in this area would greatly enhance future studies that 
require meteorological data from the area.   
     The lack of information available from NFS was another limitation faced throughout this 
study.  Several attempts were made to include NFS in the study, but due to the sensitivity of the 
subject matter, knowledge of currently stored chemicals, and other variables were unknown.  
Because of this, several assumptions were made involving key components of the study. 
 
Assumptions 
     Due to the lack of information available from NFS, several assumptions had to be made 
during the course of this study: 
1) UF6 cylinders have been present on the NFS site in the past, but it could not be 
confirmed if they are currently being used and stored on site at this time.   
2) The cylinder inventory list included within the RASCAL 4.3 software program was 
used to determine tank size and volume because it is unknown what size tanks have 
been in use at the NFS facility. 
3) It was assumed that UF6 was in a liquid state when modeling chemical release plumes 
using RASCAL 4.3.  The release rate, release fraction, and uranium enrichment level 
variables for liquid UF6 were obtained from the default values within the RASCAL 
4.3 software program. 
4) A direct release to the atmosphere with no reductions (e.g. through a building, 
through filters) was used for each chemical plume model because it is not known 
where on site UF6 cylinders have been stored. 
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Future Research 
     Erwin faces transportation problems as it relates to road infrastructure and the rail system.  
Currently, there are 3 major access points that allow for vehicles to cross the rail system that runs 
directly through town.  Two of these points are either underpass or overpass bridges that permit 
the flow of vehicular traffic even if a train is present on the tracks, but the access point in the 
downtown area cannot be crossed if a train is present.  A proposal to build a bridge in this area is 
currently in the developmental phase and it would benefit the community if research on 
evacuation modeling was conducted in the future to determine the effectiveness of this bridge in 
facilitating evacuation. 
     Several other avenues for future research exist, including the study of mass evacuations 
during specific times of the day and on specific days of the year, such as the popular Apple 
Festival, which draws approximately 110,000 people annually to the city center in late Autumn.  
Furthermore, the local population will increase in residential areas during the night time hours 
and increase in commercial areas during the day.  This diurnal shift in population distribution 
will impact the time required for evacuation in residential versus commercial areas as a function 
of the time of day.  Further studies should target sheltering in place and how the safety of doing 
so is affected by infiltration rates of chemicals in certain buildings.  Certain structures may be 
more susceptible to certain chemicals rendering a shelter in place action useless.   
     Improved evacuation models can be created by performing a risk assessment of the 
community by using socio-demographic data.  Cutter et al. (2000) developed a method for 
assessing vulnerability by evaluating social characteristics such as population, differential access 
to resources, and level of wealth.  This type of research can enhance the evacuation model by 
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identifying the segment of the population that may be unable to evacuate due to financial means, 
age, health, and gender. 
     Another area for future research is the evaluation of other anthropogenic and natural hazards 
that may affect the populace.  This study only examined the chemical release of UF6 from 
Nuclear Fuel Services, but it is possible that a different chemical may increase the population’s 
risk if it was released.  Nuclear Fuel Services also ships and receives numerous amounts of 
chemicals by rail through the town of Erwin, which could pose a threat to the community in the 
event of a train incident.  Future research is necessary to understand the risks associated with 
railway hazards. As far as natural hazards are concerned, Erwin’s geographical location makes it 
very susceptible to flooding, which has been a major concern in the past.  Identifying the areas at 
risk and implementing an evacuation action for these areas would be beneficial to the community 
and aid in mitigating potential injury and loss of life.   
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
          RASCAL 4.3 and ArcCASPER in conjunction with a GIS have demonstrated the 
usefulness of geospatial modeling software to create an emergency evacuation and sheltering 
plan for a specific chemical release at NFS.  The functions provided within these software 
programs were efficient and allowed for an evaluation of the possible affected areas.  These 
software were valuable tools throughout the research process. 
     Mandatory evacuation and sheltering in place used in combination with each other were 
determined to be effective strategies in the event of a UF6 chemical release. The infrastructure in 
Erwin is sufficient to accommodate an efficient and timely evacuation of the populace within 2 
miles of the chemical release and downwind of the projected chemical plume; however, all 
critical facilities located in the chemical plume path were recommended to shelter in place 
because efficient and effective evacuation of these facilities is improbable.  This increases the 
exposure time to the UF6 chemical. 
     This study has demonstrated that the potential for a cylinder rupture is low, and that the 
impact of a cylinder rupture is minor due to the dissipation of the UF6 chemical before it reaches 
a large populace.  However, it is imperative that the populace remain vigilant for industrial 
hazards as history has demonstrated that complacency can lead to a false sense of security.  A 
hazard can manifest into a disaster when least expected, so it is imperative to develop emergency 
protocols during the emergency preparedness phase to mitigate injuries and loss of life.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Meteorological Data for KTRI in Blountville, Tennessee 
 
Figure A.1: Seasonal wind speed and direction with resultant vectors for the year 2012. 
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Figure A.2:  Wind speed distribution by season for the year 2012. 
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Appendix B 
HF and U Concentration and Deposition Plumes 
 
 
Figure B.1:  HF and uranium concentration and deposition plumes for a 2.5 ton cylinder rupture   
                    using seasonal mean data for the spring of 2012. 
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Figure B.2:  HF and uranium concentration and deposition plumes for a 10 ton cylinder rupture                 
                    using seasonal mean data for the spring of 2012. 
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Figure B.3:  HF and uranium concentration and deposition plumes for a 14 ton cylinder rupture   
                    using seasonal mean data for the spring of 2012. 
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Figure B.4:  HF and uranium concentration and deposition plumes for a 2.5 ton cylinder rupture   
                    using seasonal mean data for the summer of 2012. 
 
63 
 
 
Figure B.5:  HF and uranium concentration and deposition plumes for a 10 ton cylinder rupture  
                    using seasonal mean data for the summer of 2012. 
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Figure B.6:  HF and uranium concentration and deposition plumes for a 14 ton cylinder rupture  
                    using seasonal mean data for the summer of 2012. 
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Figure B.7:  HF and uranium concentration and deposition plumes for a 2.5 ton cylinder rupture  
                    using seasonal mean data for the autumn of 2012. 
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Figure B.8:  HF and uranium concentration and deposition plumes for a 10 ton cylinder rupture  
                    using seasonal mean data for the autumn of 2012. 
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Figure B.9:  HF and uranium concentration and deposition plumes for a 14 ton cylinder rupture  
                     using seasonal mean data for the autumn of 2012. 
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Figure B.10:  HF and uranium concentration and deposition plumes for a 2.5 cylinder rupture  
                      using seasonal mean data for the winter of 2012. 
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Figure B.11:  HF and uranium concentration and deposition plumes for a 10 ton cylinder rupture  
                       using seasonal mean data for the winter of 2012. 
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Figure B.12:  HF and uranium concentration and deposition plumes for a 14 ton cylinder rupture  
                       using seasonal mean data for the winter of 2012. 
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